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JUVENILE OFFENDERS: VICTIMS OF CIRCUMSTANCE WITH A
POTENTIAL FOR REHABILITATION
Andrea Huerta∗
INTRODUCTION
Over the past fifty years, the United States Supreme Court has
examined and reexamined the question of how to treat children1 in the
criminal justice system.2 The Court has frequently held that children are
entitled to many of the same due process rights as adults.3 Nevertheless, the
Court has also opined that, “from a developmental standpoint, [children] are
different from adults, which greatly impacts how courts should treat them in
a whole host of areas.”4 Although these historical inconsistencies are not
easily reconciled, over the past decade, the Supreme Court has
acknowledged three fundamental characteristics of youth: (1) lack of
maturity, (2) vulnerability to negative influences, and (3) capacity for
change.5 These fundamental characteristics, the Court has explained, make
children “constitutionally different” from adults and “less deserving of the
most severe punishments.”6 Cumulatively, these cases represent the
Court’s “kids are different” sentencing jurisprudence.7
∗ Andrea B. Huerta, J.D. Candidate 2017. I would like to thank the faculty and staff at FIU College of
Law for fostering such a professional and academically-encouraging environment. In addition, I would
like to thank Professor Kotey and Professor Moreno for guiding me throughout my research and
motivating me along the way. Finally, thank you to the FIU Law Review Executive Board and Staff for
all your hard work in making this publication possible.
1
This Note follows the lead of Justice Kagan in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), and
uses the words “children” and “juvenile” interchangeably. See, e.g., Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465.
2
United States Supreme Court Juvenile Justice Jurisprudence, NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR.,
http://njdc.info/practice-policy-resources/united-states-supreme-court-juvenile-justice-jurisprudence/
(last visited Nov. 20, 2015) (summarizing the cases that describe the United States Supreme Court’s
major jurisprudence in the area of juvenile justice).
3
Id.
4
See id. (For further information on the cases in which the Supreme Court has previously treated
juveniles differently regarding their waiver of rights, culpability, and punishment).
5
See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2458, 2464; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005)
(holding the juvenile death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68
(2010) (holding that life without parole sentences for nonhomicide juvenile offenders violates the Eighth
Amendment).
6
See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464; see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 578 (holding the juvenile death
penalty violates the Eighth Amendment); Graham, 560 U.S. at 82 (holding that life without parole
sentences for nonhomicide juvenile offenders violates the Eighth Amendment).
7
Perry L. Moriearty, Miller v. Alabama and the Retroactivity of Proportionality Rules, 17 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 929, 937 (2015).
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Recently, in Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held that
sentencing juvenile offenders to mandatory life without the possibility of
parole (“LWOP”) violates the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.8 The juvenile justice community praised this decision,
characterizing it as a “historic” decision.9 Although this was a step in the
right direction for juvenile offenders, it was, nevertheless, just a step.10 In
Miller, the Court squandered a real opportunity;11 it expressly limited its
decision to only prohibiting the mandatory imposition of LWOP sentences
for juvenile offenders, rather than prohibiting the imposition of all LWOP
sentences for juvenile offenders.12
Thus, after Miller, it is still
constitutionally permissible for juveniles to be sentenced to LWOP so long
as the sentencer provides the juvenile with an individualized consideration
at sentencing.13
This Note will begin with a brief historical overview of the juvenile
justice system in the United States. More specifically, this Note will
explain the “kids are different” rationale. This Note continues by offering
an explanation for the Court’s incremental and minimalistic behavior, and
argues that although judicial minimalism may be appropriate in some areas,
it is not appropriate in the realm of juvenile justice. Accordingly, this Note
will use the Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama to explain how judicial
minimalism serves no purpose in the realm of Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, particularly as it relates to cases involving children. In
support of my argument, this Note will provide an analysis of the decision
in Miller v. Alabama, to establish that although the Court correctly
prohibited mandatory LWOP, it erred when it failed to prohibit all LWOP
sentences for juvenile offenders. Furthermore, this Note will explain
Miller’s effect on the juvenile justice system and the importance of
resolving the tension that exists between justice, efficiency, and fairness.
Specifically, as it relates to the “fundamental disconnect” between how
8

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
See, e.g., U.S. Supreme Court Bans Mandatory Life-Without-Parole Sentences for Children
Convicted of Homicide, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (June 25, 2012), http://eji.org/news/supreme-courtbans-mandatory-life-without-parole-sentences-for-children-miller-v-alabama.
10
Sean Craig, infra note 32, at n.195 (explaining how Executive Director Bryan Stevenson of
the Equal Justice Institute, who represented both defendants in Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455, hailed the
Supreme Court’s holding as “an important win for children” and “a significant step forward”); see also
U.S. Supreme Court Bans Mandatory Life-Without-Parole Sentences for Children Convicted of
Homicide, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (June 25, 2012), http://eji.org/node/646.
11
See David R. Dow, Don’t Believe the Hype: Supreme Court Decision on Juvenile Life Without
Parole is Weak, DAILY BEAST (June 25, 2012, 5:38 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/06
/25/don-t-believe-the-hype-supreme-court-decision-on-juvenile-life-without-parole-is-weak.html.
12
See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
13
Id.
9
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“kids are different,” and how the juvenile justice system currently
functions.
This section will explore national and global tensions
surrounding sentencing juveniles to LWOP. As to the former, this Note
attempts to explain the difficulty lower courts have experienced in
attempting to construe the Miller decision. As to the latter, this Note
highlights the international community’s disapproval towards the United
States in sentencing juveniles to LWOP.
This Note concludes by explaining how the juvenile justice system is
currently facing an opportunity for major reform. This Note proffers that it
is in the best interest of our nation, and society as a whole, for this change
to take effect. As a result, the Supreme Court must change its approach in
deciding cases involving juvenile offenders, especially as it relates to
sentencing them. Nevertheless, this Note offers various alternatives that
exist in resolving this issue. Moreover, this Note suggests that in order for
this reform to take effect, all three branches of the government, as well as
school authorities and law enforcement agencies, must come together with
one clear focus: rehabilitate juvenile offenders while also ensuring the
safety of communities.
THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: A DIZZYING PACE OF REFORM:
FROM “INNOCENT CHILDREN” TO “HYPER-VIOLENT, MORALLYDEPRAVED YOUTH”
The juvenile justice system in the United States has experienced a
roller coaster, which has resulted in a dizzying pace of reform.14 The first
juvenile court was established in Chicago, Illinois, in 1899.15 Since then,
the juvenile justice system has been reformed four times; these four periods
of reform have been characterized as follows: (1) the rehabilitative model;
(2) the due process reforms; (3) getting tough on juvenile offenders; and (4)
a window of opportunity for rethinking juvenile justice.16 This reform is
primarily attributable to the significant role that scientific research has
played in influencing attitudes and shaping policies and programs.17
Surprisingly, however, one may wonder how the principle of treating
children differently from adults only became relevant to the Supreme Court
14
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012); see also Marsha Levick, The Pendulum
Swings, Looking Back at More than a Century of Juvenile Justice Reform in the United States, 296 N.J.
LAW. 11 (2015).
15
See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE: A DEVELOPMENTAL
APPROACH 31 (Richard J. Bonnie, et al. eds., 2013).
16
See id. at 31–33.
17
See id. at 45.
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in the past decade, when this idea predates to the American Revolution.18
“The political philosopher John Locke argued that children’s . . . [inability
to reason], [which] disqualifie[s] them from participating in [the]
government, also ma[kes] them less culpable for their criminal acts.”19 By
the 20th century, this principle was embedded into the foundation of the
world’s first juvenile courts.20
The juvenile justice system was established as an alternative system to
the adult criminal system, whereby it focused on individualized
rehabilitation and treatment, civil jurisdiction, informal procedure, and
separate incapacitation.21 It was built around an idealized vision of young
offenders as “innocent children.”22 Accordingly, the first juvenile courts
functioned more like social welfare agencies than institutions of justice,
with rehabilitation and youth guidance as their primary objectives.23
Nevertheless, in the late 1960s, it appeared that the juvenile justice system
was too aspirational and was not providing juvenile offenders with
sufficient procedural protections.24 This initiated the second period of
reform, where juveniles began receiving more procedural protections.25 For
example, in 1967, the Supreme Court decided in In re Gault that juvenile
offenders are entitled to the same protections under the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment that is given to adult criminal offenders.26
However, the third period of reform was triggered in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, when juvenile (homicide) crime rates reached a temporary
peak, which the media categorized as “hyper-violent, morally-depraved,
and criminally-involved youth, who were out to terrorize society.”27
18
David S. Tanehaus, Op-Ed., The Roberts Court’s Liberal Turn on Juvenile Justice, N.Y.
TIMES (June 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/opinion/the-roberts-courts-liberal-turn-onjuvenile-justice.html?_r=0 (noting that individualized justice for children was one of the ideals of
juvenile court).
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
See Ioana Tchoukleva, Note, Children are Different: Bridging the Gap Between Rhetoric and
Reality Post Miller v. Alabama, 4 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 92, 98 (2013).
22
See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 136–37.
23
See generally JOHN D. AND CATHERINE T. MACARTHUR FOUNDATION RESEARCH NETWORK
ON ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL
PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, (Thomas Grisso and Robert G. Schwartz eds. 1992) [hereinafter
YOUTH ON TRIAL].
24
See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 35 (explaining that juvenile offenders had
no right to an attorney, and the informal hearings in which their guilt was determined lacked the rigorous
evidentiary protections of a criminal trial).
25
See id.
26
See id. (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)).
27
See id. at 38; see also Brief for NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, at 14, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646,

08-ANDREA HUERTA 04.24.2017.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

Juvenile Offenders: Victims of Circumstance

5/11/17 1:32 PM

191

Concerns for public safety trumped concerns for due process or the
constitutional rights of juvenile offenders.28 As a result, states began
adopting harsher punishments for juvenile offenders.29 Accordingly,
juvenile courts were divested of jurisdiction and punitive sanctions began
replacing treatment and rehabilitation.30 Consequently, the courts began
transferring juvenile offenders to the adult criminal court system much
more frequently. As a result, these juvenile offenders began facing the full
brunt of adult punishment, receiving not only lengthy sentences, but also
sentences of LWOP, and even death.31 This “fast track to [a] states’
harshest criminal penalties,” barely resembles any remnants from the
original juvenile justice system.32
In 1996, in an effort to understand this dramatic change, the
MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Adolescent Development and
Juvenile Justice (“MacArthur Foundation”) examined the United States
juvenile justice system through the lens of developmental psychology.33 By
carefully reviewing and analyzing both law and science, the MacArthur
Foundation demonstrated that a fair and enlightened juvenile justice system
must consider the developmental and psychological facts of adolescence.34
Upon exploring the differences between adults and children, the study
concluded that when children serve as criminal defendants, they are at a
severe disadvantage because (1) children do not have the same abilities as
adults to participate in the trial process, and (2) children should not be held
to the same level of accountability as adults when they break the law.35 As
to the former, it is critical that a defendant in a criminal trial not only have
the ability to assist his or her legal counsel, but also be able to participate in
the decision-making process.36 This is especially important in making
decisions that are crucial to a juvenile offender’s defense.37 However, the
study found that children are less likely to trust adults, which makes it more
10-9647), 2012 WL 135045 [hereinafter Brief for NAACP].
28
Brief for NAACP at 14.
29
Id. at 9.
30
See Brief for NAACP, supra note 27, at 10; see Levick, supra note 14, at 12.
31
Levick, supra note 14, at 12.
32
Sean Craig, Juvenile Life Without Parole Post-Miller: The Long, Treacherous Road Towards
a Categorical Rule, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 379, 384 (2013); see also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 70
(2010) (explaining that LWOP is an especially harsh punishment for a juvenile offenders).
33
See YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 23 (explaining that developmental psychology is a science
that challenges the current presumption that children somehow stop being children when they commit
crimes).
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
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difficult for the attorney representing them to gain their trust.38
Moreover, the study discovered that most children do not understand
the concept and meaning of a “legal right.”39 The choices children make
are all affected by their emotional and cognitive immaturity, susceptibility
to peer pressure, and their perceptions and attitudes concerning risk.40
Accordingly, how juvenile offenders make decisions supports the
conclusion that they are less responsible than adult offenders in similar
situations.41 This is primarily because children do not have the same level
of competence or culpability as adults, and thus, should be treated
accordingly in our juvenile justice system; hence, the notion behind “kids
are different.”
In 2005, this research took center stage in Roper v. Simmons, where
the Supreme Court relied on scientific and sociological data, to find it
unconstitutional for juvenile offenders to be sentenced to death.42 In Roper,
the Court explained that the Eighth Amendment applied to the death penalty
with special force because it is the most severe punishment an offender can
receive.43 Five years later, the Court reaffirmed this “kids are different”
principle in Graham v. Florida, where it found that a LWOP sentence for a
juvenile, who did not commit murder is unconstitutional.44 In Graham, the
Court reasoned that LWOP “is an especially harsh punishment for a
juvenile” because “[u]nder this sentence, a juvenile offender will on
average serve more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than
an adult offender.”45 The Court analogized LWOP sentences to death
sentences, explaining that in both sentences, the offender will die in
prison.46 Thus, a LWOP sentence imposed on a juvenile, and a LWOP
sentence imposed on an adult, is essentially only the same in name.47
Recently, in Miller, the Court held that sentencing juveniles to a mandatory
LWOP is unconstitutional.48 Notably, the juvenile justice system appears to
be slowly coming full circle, where we currently find ourselves in the fourth

38

Id.
See YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 23.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568–70 (2005).
43
Id. at 568.
44
See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 70–71 (2010).
45
Id. at 70.
46
See id.
47
See id.
48
See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2485 (2012); see also Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136
S. Ct. 718, 732 (2016) (finding the holding in Miller announced a new substantive rule that was
retroactive in cases on collateral review).
39
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stage of reform, the “Window of Opportunity for Rethinking the Juvenile
Justice System.”49
THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
The Eight Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.”50
In these cases, the Justices must figure out how to interpret the meaning of
the phrase “cruel and unusual punishment.”51 The issues that arise in this
context illustrate how the Court often engages in incremental decisionmaking, where it tends to limit its ruling only to the circumstances of each
case, and one step at a time.52 Moreover, in these cases, the Court often
looks to its decision in Trop v. Dulles, which is considered the benchmark
case for understanding the phrase “cruel and unusual punishment.”53
According to Trop, the Court must decide whether the punishment violates
the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.”54 Accordingly, since Trop, there is a presumption that the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment will change over time, “as society’s
views on different criminal sanctions change.”55 Therefore, in interpreting
the Eighth Amendment, the Court looks to see “what people actually
think.”56 Thus, in determining society’s standards of decency, the Court
employs a two-part inquiry. First, the Court consults “the objective indicia”
of relevant legislative enactments and sentencing juries to determine
whether there is a national consensus against a sentence.57 Finally, the
Court analyzes the penological justifications for the sentence and applies its
own independent judgment to decide whether the punishment is cruel and
unusual.58

49

See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 41.
U.S. Const. amend. VII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
51
Stephen Wormiel, SCOTUS for Law Students: Defining the Contours of the Eighth
Amendment, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 11, 2011, 4:40 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/11/scotus-forlaw-students-defining-the-contours-of-the-eighth-amendment/ (explaining the important and divisive
role Justices play in interpreting, and thus, determining what the phrase “cruel and unusual punishment”
means in today’s world).
52
Id.
53
Id.; see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958).
54
Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
55
Wormiel, supra note 51.
56
See Dow, supra note 11.
57
See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2470 (2012).
58
Id. at 2466.
50
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THE SUPREME COURT’S INCREMENTAL DECISION-MAKING AND
MINIMALISTIC BEHAVIOR
“The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our time.”59
As mentioned above, judicial minimalism is prevalent in decisions where
the justices engage in incremental decision-making. Although the decision
in Miller will be discussed more in depth below, this Note uses Miller as an
example of judicial minimalism. For example, in Miller, the Court
expressly limited its ruling to only prohibiting the mandatory nature of the
sentencing scheme involving juvenile offenders, and intentionally avoided
the larger question of whether to prohibit sentencing all juvenile offenders
to LWOP.60
In analyzing jurisprudential philosophies, justices are usually defined
as being one of four varieties: (1) majoritarians,61 (2) perfectionists,62 (3)
minimalists,63 or (4) fundamentalists.64 At this time, the Court is comprised
of mostly minimalists.65 “Minimalists are conservative in the literal
sense.”66 They “prefer nudges to earthquakes.”67 With judicial minimalism,
the justices prefer to take small steps, and attempt to do only what is
“minimally” necessary to resolve the cases before them.68 Minimalists do
not attempt to revolutionize the law by reference to first principles and thus,
prefer to avoid radical revisions.69 Although minimalists may not always
59

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015).
See Cass R. Sunstein, Minimal Appeal, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 1, 2005), https://newrepublic
.com/article/64638/minimal-appeal (explaining that minimalists can either be liberal or conservative
because “minimalism is a method and a constraint” rather than a program that produces particular
results) [hereinafter Sunstein, Minimal Appeal].
61
Id. (noting that many of the great social programs of the New Deal era were legitimated as a
result of majoritarianism).
62
Id. (describing the Warren Court as perfectionists and explaining that in the last decade,
perfectionists have sought to use the Constitution to strike down bans on same-sex marriage, to create a
right to welfare, and to give people a right to make medical decisions free from governmental intrusion).
63
Id. (describing Justices Breyer and Ginsburg as “Judicial Minimalists”); see also Mary
Berkheiser, Developmental Detour: How the Minimalism of Miller v. Alabama Led the Court’s “Kids
Are Different” Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence Down a Blind Alley, 46 AKRON L. REV. 489, 515
(2013) (explaining that on the Roberts Court, all but two of the Court’s most conservative jurists have
embraced judicial minimalism in one form or another).
64
See Sunstein, Minimal Appeal, supra note 60 (describing Justice Thomas and former Justice
Scalia as fundamentalists, who are committed to “originalism”).
65
See Berkheiser, supra note 63, at 515.
66
See Sunstein, Minimal Appeal, supra note 60.
67
Id. (describing Justices Frankfurter and Marshall Harlan as the great conservative voices on
the Warren Court, and committed minimalists, who often criticized the Court’s tendency to “issue
sweeping rules”); see also Berkheiser, supra note 63.
68
See Sunstein, Minimal Appeal, supra note 60.
69
See id.
60
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agree with how previous judges have ruled, they nevertheless respect prior
rulings “partly because respect promotes stability, and partly because
respect makes it unnecessary for judges to fight over the most fundamental
questions whenever a new problem arises.”70 Accordingly, minimalists
prefer to decide cases rather than adopt theories.71
It is often argued that the Supreme Court is a human institution that
must adapt to the changing conditions shaped by American society and
policy.72 The Court’s role is noteworthy because of the difficult role it
assumes in American political life.73 This is primarily due to the
controversial appointments of justices, the justices’ struggle for influence,
the Court’s more bureaucratic structure, and the political controversies that
are sparked by the important cases it decides.74 Generally speaking, the
Court’s opinions serve as an institutional justification for collective
decisions. Today, however, the Court appears to be acting more like a
political body, making political decisions, where its power in selecting its
cases enables it to assume a “super legislature” role.75 When the Court is
deciding major questions of public policy, it attempts to answer political
controversies using the language, structure, and spirit of the Constitution.76
The Court’s power lies in the persuasiveness of its rulings and rests with
other political institutions, and public opinion.77 Therefore, because the
Court is comprised of justices with sharp differences in approach, it has a
tendency of behaving in a way that is likely due to its need to “muster the
five votes,” as well as the difficulty in drawing lines.78
Accordingly, the Court in Miller laid down a minimalistic and
incremental decision.79 Although the majority expressed, and the dissenters
acknowledged,80 the Court’s “kids are different” approach,81 the dissenters
were nevertheless adamant about leaving this decision to the legislature and
state practice.82 In response to the majority’s observation that discretionary
LWOP sentences should be “uncommon,” Chief Justice Roberts interpreted

70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Id.
See id.
DAVID M. OBRIEN, STORM CENTER 106 (Lisa C. McKay, 10th ed. 2014).
Id. at 31.
Id.
Id. at 227.
Id. at 259.
Id.
See Dow, supra note 11.
Berkheiser, supra note 63, at 516.
See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2477–78 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
See id.
See id.
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this as the majority’s way of “bootstrap[ing] its way to declaring that the
Eighth Amendment absolutely prohibits” LWOP sentences for juveniles.83
Prior to this portion of the opinion, the majority appeared to be going down
a path where the only logical conclusion was that it was going to
categorically prohibit all LWOP sentences.84 Therefore, the dissenters
argued, the majority’s opinion merely paved the way for “further judicial
displacement of the legislative role in prescribing appropriate punishment
for crime.”85
In Miller, the Court could have—and should have—relied on the
Eighth Amendment to explain how “cruel and unusual” it is for society to
determine that a twelve-year-old boy or girl is so incorrigible or so “morally
depraved” that they need to be locked up forever.86 There are likely only
two presumptions that can potentially explain the Court’s approach. First,
the majority only addressed the issue before the Court and intentionally
avoided the larger question in order to pave the way for the Court to address
it in a future case. In the alternative, considering the “need to muster the
five votes,” the difficulty in “drawing lines,” or both, perhaps the majority
only decided “what was necessary,” to find the mandatory nature of the
LWOP sentence unconstitutional.87 Regardless, it is clear that these are just
small steps that are likely the result of judicial minimalism.88
Consequently, the Court in Miller is criticized for making “either a big
mistake or a terrible blunder.”89
Nevertheless one thing is clear: the decision in Miller indicates a sharp
indication of how the American judicial system views juvenile offenders.90
In fact, “[w]hat we are seeing is a very stark and important rethinking” of
how juvenile offenders are treated.91 For example, as explained, prior to

83
Id. at 2481 (using the word “unusual” as a synonym for “uncommon,” Chief Justice Roberts
explains how eventually, the practice of LWOP will become so rare that the national consensus of
LWOP will be practically non-existent and thus, the Court will be able to make LWOP unconstitutional
in a later case in the future); see also id. at 2469 (majority opinion).
84
See also id. at 2469 (majority opinion).
85
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2481 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
86
See, e.g., Dow, supra note 11.
87
See id.
88
See Sunstein, Minimal Appeal, supra note 60.
89
See Dow, supra note 11.
90
Ethan Bronner, Sentencing Ruling Reflects Rethinking on Juvenile Justice, N.Y. TIMES (June
26, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/us/news-analysis-ruling-reflects-rethinking-on-juvenilejustice.html?_r=0 (quoting Marsha Levick, co-founder of the nonprofit Juvenile Law Center in
Philadelphia in 1975, “For years we were trying to convince the courts that kids have constitutional
rights just like adults. Now we realize that to ensure kids are protected, we have to recognize that they
are actually different from adults.”).
91
See id.
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Roper, all juvenile offenders faced the death penalty,92 and prior to
Graham, nonhomicide juvenile offenders potentially faced LWOP
sentences.93 Accordingly, in less than a decade, the Court has stepped away
from (1) sentencing children to die,94 (2) sentencing nonhomicide juvenile
offenders to LWOP,95 and (3) mandatorily sentencing children to LWOP.96
However, the one thing that distinguishes the first two cases from the last is
the Court’s approach. For example, in Roper and Graham, the Court’s
decisions were not minimalistic because in both, the Court categorically
prohibited the sentences in their entirety.97 However, in Miller, the Court
only prohibited the mandatory nature of the sentence.98
This is not to say that judicial minimalism is never appropriate.
Judicial minimalism may be an appropriate approach in some areas of the
law.99 However, the juvenile justice system is not one of those areas.100
Considering all that is known about how “kids are different,” and should
accordingly be treated differently, the Court must drastically move towards
preventing
juveniles
from
being
sentenced
unfairly
and
disproportionately.101 In fact, considering the rate at which issues relating
to juvenile sentencing arise, the Court must provide future sentencers with
“a sense of what the law is,” or it will result in a significant burden on
decisionmakers, future juvenile offenders, and their families.102 A look at
the Court’s history indicates that in several occasions, it has recognized
such issues in other cases. For example, after decades of confusion
regarding when a confession is considered voluntary, the Court decided the
landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona.103 In Miranda, the Court presumed
92

See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551 (2005).
See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 48 (2010).
94
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 551.
95
See Graham, 560 U.S. at 48.
96
See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
97
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 555; Graham, 560 U.S. at 48.
98
See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2455.
99
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism, 43 TULSA L. REV. 825 (2008) (describing how
minimalism can be “a terrible blunder” in some areas, and explaining the areas where judicial
minimalism may be appropriate, even though, in the end, they do not, “provide an adequate justification
of minimalism”) [hereinafter Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism].
100
See id. at 826 (explaining that minimalist rulings may only be appropriate when they
decrease the costs of decisions and errors).
101
See Bronner, supra note 90 (quoting Lisa M. Wayne, president of the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers, “[n]ow all the research and the rulings support what we have known in our
hearts to be true.”); see also Chang et al., infra note 172, at 95–101 (discussing disproportionate and
extraordinary length sentences).
102
See Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism, supra note 99, at 836 (arguing that there is no
adequate justification for judicial minimalism).
103
See id. at 837 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966) and using it as an
93
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that all custodial interrogations created inherent coercion and required law
enforcement to provide all suspects with a set of warnings before
commencing custodial interrogations.104 In clarifying this area of the law,
the Court understood the importance of providing further guidance due to
the confusion and difficulty that resulted from the case-by-case analysis on
the “voluntariness of confessions.”105
The Court similarly employed this more expansive approach in Roper
and Graham, where, among other things, the Court exercised its own
independent judgment to reverse its position on the sentencing scheme at
issue in both cases.106 For instance, in Roper, the Court noted that “the
prosecutor argued Simmons’ youth was aggravating rather than mitigating,
and although this sort of overreaching could be corrected by a particular
rule to ensure that the mitigating force of youth is not overlooked”—such as
the one laid down in Miller—it would nevertheless “not address the Court’s
larger concerns.”107 Therefore, specifically in regards to the juvenile justice
system, because the costs and errors of these minimalistic decisions are too
high and too risky, the Court must engage in a more expansive approach to
further clarify this area of the law.108
THE MILLER DECISION
In June 2012, the Supreme Court decided two companion cases, Miller
v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs, where two fourteen-year-old boys were
convicted of murder and mandatorily sentenced to LWOP.109 The Court
explained that in both cases, “[s]tate law mandated that each juvenile die in
prison even if a judge or jury would have thought his youth and its
attendant characteristics, along with the nature of his crime, made a lesser
sentence more appropriate.”110 Thus, the Court concluded, mandatory
sentencing schemes are unconstitutional when applied to LWOP for
juveniles.111
example of the importance of an expansive constitutional law interpretation); see also Miranda, 384
U.S. at 478–79.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
See Berkheiser, supra note 63, at 514 n.210; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551
(2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 48 (2010).
107
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 573.
108
See Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism, supra note 99, at 826 (minimalist rulings may
only be appropriate when they decrease the costs of decisions and errors).
109
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2457 (2012).
110
Id. at 2460.
111
Id. at 2463.
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This conclusion was premised on two strands of precedent.112 The first
strand focused on Roper v. Simmons and Graham v. Florida.113 Together,
these decisions adopted categorical bans on sentencing practices based on
mismatches between the culpability of a class of offenders and the severity
of the penalty.114 The second strand was based on Woodson v. North
Carolina and Lockett v. Ohio, which collectively required sentencing
authorities to consider a defendant’s characteristics and the details of the
offense before sentencing the defendant to death.115 Based on these cases,
the Court in Miller concluded that children are entitled to an “individualized
consideration” before being sentenced to LWOP.116 Accordingly, Miller
reaffirmed the principle that “kids are different.”117
Although the majority and the dissenters both acknowledged the “kids
are different” principle, the evolving standards of decency inquiry caused a
split amongst the Justices.118 Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito dissented, explaining that a national consensus existed
because there was evidence of twenty-nine jurisdictions permitting
mandatory LWOP for juveniles.119 The majority disagreed and emphasized
its narrow decision, explaining that a national consensus was not needed
because it was not banning LWOP in its entirety, but merely requiring a
sentencer to follow a certain process before sentencing a juvenile to
LWOP.120
The majority reasoned that states authorizing LWOP sentences for
juveniles do so through “two independent statutory provisions”—one
allowing the transfer of juveniles to adult court, and the other setting
penalties for those who are tried in adult court.121 Nevertheless, the
majority explained, this process did not indicate that “the penalty ha[d]
been endorsed through deliberate . . . legislative consideration.”122
However, unpersuaded by the majority’s rationale, the dissenters

112
113

Id.
Id.; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48,

48 (2010).
114

Id.
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012); see also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
116
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470.
117
Id. at 2470.
118
Id. at 2478 (Roberts, C.J. dissenting).
119
Id. at 2477 (arguing that if 2,500 juveniles are serving LWOP, the sentence is not unusual).
120
See id. at 2471 (majority opinion).
121
Id. at 2472.
122
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2472 (2012) (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67
(2010)).
115
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vehemently disagreed and criticized the majority for imposing its own
values and displacing “the legislative role in proscribing appropriate
punishment for crime.”123 The Court nevertheless stopped short of banning
all juvenile LWOP sentences.124 Thus, Miller only requires judges to
consider a juvenile’s age and attendant characteristics before irrevocably
sentencing the juvenile to spend the rest of his or her life in prison.125
As a result, the Miller decision merely purported to “help” about
eighty percent of the 2,500 juvenile inmates serving mandatory LWOP
sentences.126 However, this is more of a theory than a fact, because in
Miller, the Court did not rule that LWOP is absolutely prohibited and
therefore, unconstitutional when applied to juvenile offenders.127 Instead, it
explained that sentencing juveniles to mandatory LWOP should be
“uncommon.”128 The majority intentionally left open the possibility of there
being some “appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest
possible penalty. . . .”129 Therefore, the Court stopped short of banning the
sentence in its entirety and thus, merely banned the mandated nature of the
sentencing procedure.130
ANALYSIS
WHERE MILLER WENT WRONG
Although the decision in Miller signaled another step forward for the
juvenile justice community, it was in effect, only a small step forward.131 In
its decision, the Court took a “decided detour” around the Eighth
Amendment “kids are different” jurisprudence.132 Most importantly, it
departed from the precedent on which it passionately relied on.133 For
instance, although it relied on Roper and Graham in its legal analysis, the
decision veered far away from the conclusion of those decisions.134
Specifically, Miller did not impose a broad categorical rule prohibiting
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134

Id. at 2481 (Roberts, C.J. dissenting); see also Dow, supra note 11.
See Tanehaus, supra note 18.
See id.
See Dow, supra note 11.
Id.
See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
Id.
Id. at 2463.
See Sunstein, Minimal Appeal, supra note 60.
See Berkheiser, supra note 63, at 507.
See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2455.
See Berkheiser, supra note 63, at 501.
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LWOP sentences on all juvenile offenders, which is a result both Roper and
Graham reached.135 A categorical ban on all LWOP sentences on juvenile
offenders would have drawn a clear line, which is necessary to ensure these
“cruel and unusual” punishments are not imposed on juvenile offenders.136
However, the Court in Miller distinguished its decision from the one it
made in Graham by relying on the fact that Graham imposed a “flat ban”
on LWOP sentences applicable to only nonhomicide crimes.137 Although
the decision in Graham only related to nonhomicide offenses, Miller was
not similarly constrained because both of the petitioners had requested the
Court to consider prohibiting LWOP sentences for all juvenile offenders.138
There is no reason, nor does the Court attempt to provide for one, as to why
juveniles who commit murder are more culpable, and thus, distinguishable
from those who do not.139
Moreover, a central problem in Miller is that it requires lower courts to
employ a case-by-case, individualized sentencing scheme, which is an
approach the Court expressly rejected in both Roper and Graham.140 In
Roper, the Court originally considered individualized sentencing,
acknowledging that it was a central feature in death penalty sentencing
cases.141 However, in rejecting this approach, the Court announced the
“kids are different” principle and emphasized the potential risks that exist
when the “brutality or cold-blooded nature of [a] particular crime
overpower mitigating arguments based on youth as a matter of course.”142
As a result, the Court explained, “in some cases, a defendant’s youth may
even be counted against him.”143 The Court also found it compelling how

135

See Brian J. Fuller, Case Note, A Small Step Forward in Juvenile Sentencing, But Is It
Enough? The United States Supreme Court Ends Mandatory Juvenile Life Without Parole Sentences;
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), 13 WYO. L. REV. 377, 382–84 (2013) (explaining had the
Court employed the Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis, it would have relied on the objective
indicia of societal consensus and its own independent moral judgment to establish a categorical ban on
the imposition of juvenile LWOP sentences).
136
See Berkheiser, supra note 63, at 501; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551 (2005);
Graham v. Florida, 450 U.S. 48 (2010).
137
See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012); see also Berkheiser, supra note 63, at
501.
138
See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465; see also Berkheiser, supra note 63, at 501.
139
See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (finding sufficient its holding that mandatory LWOP sentences
for juvenile offenders violates the Eighth Amendment, thus it did not need to “consider Jackson’s and
Miller’s alternative argument that the Eighth Amendment requires a categorical bar on [LWOP] for
juveniles, or at least for those 14 and younger.”).
140
See Berkheiser, supra note 63, at 502.
141
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005) (explaining this “system is designed to
consider both aggravating and mitigating circumstances, including youth, in every case.”).
142
Id. at 572–73.
143
See id. at 573 (noting “the prosecutor argued Simmons’ youth was aggravating rather than
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even expert psychologists find it difficult and refrain from attempting to
differentiate between juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect a capacity for
change, from those whose crimes reflect “irreparable corruption.”144 The
Court thus concluded that states must similarly “refrain from asking jurors
to issue a far graver condemnation—that a juvenile merits the death
penalty.”145 Accordingly, to ensure that no juvenile offender would be
sentenced to death again, the Court adopted a rule, whereby all juvenile
offenders were placed off limits.146
Additionally, in Graham, the Court battled with confining the
boundaries147 of the LWOP sentences for non-homicide juvenile offenders,
which required “a case-specific gross disproportionality inquiry.”148 In
rejecting this case-specific disproportionality inquiry, the Court noted the
potential risk of inaccuracy associated with attempting to distinguish
between juvenile offenders who are incorrigible and those who have the
capacity for change.149 Furthermore, this approach fails to consider the
difficulties associated with representing juvenile offenders.150 Thus, the
Court focused on protecting nonhomicide, juvenile offenders from being
erroneously sentenced to LWOP because of the risk of a judge or jury
finding the juvenile sufficiently culpable to deserve a LWOP sentence.151
Thus, based on all that we know about how “kids are different,” the Court
in Roper and Graham rejected individualized sentencing schemes because
of the risks that gory facts of a heinous crime committed by a juvenile
offender would pose in a judge or jury’s sentencing determination.152

mitigating,” and although “this sort of overreaching could be corrected by a particular rule to ensure that
the mitigating force of youth is not overlooked, [it] would not address [the Court’s] larger concerns.”).
144
Id. (explaining the rule prohibiting psychiatrists from diagnosing patients under the age of
eighteen with antisocial personality disorders).
145
Id. (prohibiting states from ending a juvenile’s life and potential to attain a mature
understanding of his own maturity).
146
See id. at 574; see also Berkheiser, supra note 63, at 504.
147
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 77 (2010) (explaining how difficult sentencing is for trial
judges, because they must take into account “the human existence of the offender and the just demands
of a wronged society”).
148
Id. (the case-specific gross disproportionality inquiry requires that the sentencer consider the
offender’s age and weigh it against the seriousness of the crime).
149
Id. (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005)).
150
Id. at 78 (explaining how juveniles mistrust adults and have limited understandings of the
criminal justice system, as well as the roles of the institutional actors within it); see also YOUTH ON
TRIAL, supra note 23.
151
Id. at 79.
152
Berkheiser, supra note 63, at 510; Roper, 543 U.S. at 573 (explaining how the defendant’s
youth was used as an aggravating rather than a mitigating factor); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 76
(2010) (explaining how the sentencing judge found the defendant “irredeemably depraved,” and
“incorrigible”).
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Notwithstanding this, Miller neglected all the potential risks associated with
such a sentencing scheme and “inject[ed] it into the very heart of
sentencing.”153
Although the “lynchpin of the Graham logic” was based on the
juvenile’s “diminished culpability” and “heightened capacity for change,”
the Court in Miller disregarded the penological justifications that it had
relied on in Graham.154 Although “[t]he Eighth Amendment does not
mandate adoption of any one penological theory,” it is not dispositive in
establishing whether a sentence is justified.155 Thus, a sentence lacking any
legitimate penological justification, is in effect, disproportionate to the
offense.156 In fact, the Court in Graham explained that LWOP is “the
second most severe penalty permitted by law.”157 In explaining the severity
of a LWOP sentence, the Court in Graham compared LWOP to a death
sentence, noting that LWOP: “[M]eans denial of hope; it means that good
behavior and character improvement are immaterial; it means that whatever
the future might hold in store for the mind and spirit of the convict, he will
remain in prison for the rest of his days.”158
In Miller, the Court was correct in considering the penological
justifications before concluding that none of the penological goals were
served by the mandatory sentencing schemes.159 Namely, deterrence plays
no role in the decision-making process of juvenile offenders because they
make impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions, which indicates
they are less likely to take possible punishment into consideration when
making such decisions.160 Additionally, although incapacitation is an
important goal because of the risk that an offender’s potential recidivism
might pose to society, justifying LWOP for a juvenile requires “making a
judgment that the juvenile is incorrigible.”161 Notably, this runs contrary to
the notion that juveniles have “greater prospects of reform.”162 Finally,
153

See Berkheiser, supra note 63, at 513.
See Graham, 560 U.S. at 74; see also Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
155
See id. at 71 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991) and noting that the
Court has recognized four penological sanctions as legitimate: (1) retribution, (2) deterrence, (3)
incapacitation, and (4) rehabilitation).
156
See id.
157
See id. at 69–70 (noting that LWOP is an especially harsh punishment for a juvenile offender
to serve because he or she will serve more years in prison than an adult offender).
158
See id. at 70 (citing Naovarath v. State, 105 Nev. 525, 526 (1989)).
159
See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465–66 (2012).
160
See id.; see also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 72 (2010) (Juveniles offenders “have a lack
of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility.”).
161
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 72).
162
See supra text accompanying note 5 (“Capacity for change” is one of the three fundamental
characteristics that make children constitutionally different from adults.).
154
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rehabilitation is a penological goal that forms the basis of parole systems.163
Accordingly, as the Court in Miller acknowledged, LWOP “cannot be
justified by the goal of rehabilitation,”164 because this penalty “forswears
altogether the rehabilitative ideal.”165
Most defendants serving LWOP rarely receive access to the
rehabilitative services that are available to other inmates.166 Juvenile
offenders need and are most receptive to such rehabilitation. The absence
of such rehabilitative services or treatments results in an extremely
disproportionate punishment for juvenile offenders.167 However, despite
the Court’s understanding and awareness of the lack of justifications that
make LWOP sentences inadequate for juvenile offenders, it surprisingly
still believes there would be “appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles
to [LWOP].”168 This narrow decision in Miller failed to offer any reason or
explanation for its limited ruling, which in turn, has left many questions
unanswered. The resulting effect of this decision is discussed in the
following section.
MILLER’S EFFECT ON THE FUTURE OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE
SYSTEM
Those who sought resentencing under Miller faced a “head-on
collision with everything Roper and Graham warned against.”169 Although
Miller provided all juvenile offenders with the opportunity to seek a lesser
sentence, it failed to ensure that this new sentencing determination was the
product of sound and principled decision-making.170 For example, because
Miller only required sentencers to consider the fact that children are
different, and how these differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing
them to LWOP, it failed to provide any guidelines for sentencing such
juvenile offenders.171 Accordingly, it left many questions unanswered. First,
will it apply retroactively?172 Second, will it apply to discretionary

163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172

Graham, 560 U.S. at 73.
Id. at 74.
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465.
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010).
Id.
See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
See Berkheiser, supra note 63, at 507.
See id. at 514.
See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
See Robert S. Chang et al., Evading Miller, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 85, 86 (2015).
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sentencing schemes or extraordinary length sentences?173 Lastly, what, if
anything, does Miller require when courts sentence juvenile offenders on a
case-by-case basis?174 As a result, states were left responding to these
situations differently, using a variety of approaches, which in turn, has
resulted in many different conclusions.175 The most concerning of these
approaches relates to those states that “have found ways to circumvent” the
individualized sentencing scheme required by Miller.176
First, Miller never addressed the question177 of resentencing inmates
who had already been mandatorily sentenced to LWOP for crimes
committed when they were children.178 Accordingly, this question—of
retroactivity—resulted in state courts responding differently.179 While some
of the states that found Miller retroactive provided juvenile offenders with
an opportunity to be resentenced, other states did not.180 Consequently,
similar offenders, in similar positions, have been treated and subsequently
sentenced very differently.181
A retroactivity analysis usually follows the framework provided for in
Teague v. Lane, which provided distinctions for determining a “new rule”
versus an “old rule,” and “between decisions based on ‘substantive’ law
rather than procedure.”182 Most courts addressing this issue found that
Miller announced a new rule, however, they reached different conclusions
on whether it was a substantive rule or if it constituted a watershed rule of
criminal procedure.183 For instance, courts in Florida, Michigan, and

173

Id. at 87.
Id. at 92.
175
See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 725 (2016) (comparing the cases that have
reached different conclusions on whether the holding in Miller was retroactive).
176
Chang et al., supra note 172, at 87–88.
177
Although the Supreme Court subsequently found the holding in Miller is retroactive, this
portion of the analysis is limited to only discussing the issues that arose after Miller. See Montgomery
v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). A more thorough analysis of the retroactivity issue is beyond the
scope of this Note.
178
See The Sentencing Project, Slow to Act: State Responses to 2012 Supreme Court Mandate
on Life Without Parole 3 (2014), http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/jj_State_Responses_to_
Miller.pdf [hereinafter The Sentencing Project].
179
See id.; see also Lyle Denniston, Argument Preview: A New Look–Maybe–at Life Sentences
for Youths, SCOTUSBLOG, www.sctousblog.com/2015/10/a-new-look-maybe-at-life-sentences-foryouths (explaining the complexity of the decision in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)).
180
See The Sentencing Project, supra note 178.
181
See id.
182
See Chang et al., supra note 172, at 92; see also Teague, 489 U.S. at 289.
183
See Chang et al., supra note 172, at 92; see also Denniston, supra note 179 (explaining how
Teague Doctrine requires a new rule apply retroactively in two circumstances: “first, if it is a substantive
rule limiting the kind of conduct that can be treated as criminal or limiting a kind of punishment that can
be imposed; or, second, if it is a procedural rule that goes to the basic fairness of a criminal trial.”).
174
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Minnesota interpreted Miller as a procedural rule, finding that Miller was
“not retroactively applicable to cases pending on collateral review.”184 On
the other hand, state courts in Mississippi, Massachusetts, Illinois, Iowa,
and Louisiana, found that Miller announced a substantive rule, which did
apply retroactively to cases on collateral review.185 Nevertheless, despite the
Court’s ruling in Montgomery v. Louisiana, states still retain the authority
to decide whether to provide retroactive relief under their respective
retroactivity doctrines.186
Additionally, although recent studies suggest a “robust consensus”
against the use of juvenile LWOP,187 and boast about the “speed and
consistency” in which states have responded to Miller, these conclusions
are misleading.188 The fact that states factually or statistically appear to be
rejecting the idea of juvenile LWOP is not dispositive. These states may not
be sentencing juveniles to LWOP, but instead, are in-effect imposing
sentences that are the functional equivalent of a LWOP.189 For example, it
has been reported that since Miller, fourteen of the twenty-eight states that
had mandatory juvenile LWOP sentences before Miller, have enacted laws
“in compliance” with federal law.190 These laws may appear beneficial to
juvenile offenders because they restrict the imposition of a maximum
number of years that the juvenile may be sentenced. However, they also
provide the minimum term that a juvenile may be sentenced, which
generally range from fifteen years to forty years.191
These issues are specifically prevalent in the context of whether Miller
was limited solely to mandatory sentences or if it also included
discretionary or extraordinary length sentences. This issue can be
especially attributed to the majority’s decision in Miller to conclude with
184
Cara H. Drinan, Commentary: Misconstruing Graham & Miller, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 786,
791 (2014) (discussing the many ways in which state actors have failed to comply with the Court’s
mandate).
185
Id.
186
See Juvenile Life Without Parole After Miller v. Alabama, A Report of the Phillips Black
Project, at 2 (July 2015).
187
Cf. Brief of The Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race & the Justice & the Criminal
Justice Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 12, Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.
Ct. 718 (2016) (No. 14–280) (arguing a national consensus exists against the use of LWOP because
most states have abandoned the practice of sentencing juveniles to LWOP in law or practice).
188
Id. at 6 (comparing the rate that states have “responded” to Miller to explain that it has been
much faster than that of other decisions involving juveniles by relying on that fact that in the three years
since Miller, an average of three states per year have repudiated juvenile LWOP).
189
Chang et al., supra note 172, at 100.
190
But cf. Miller v. Alabama and Juvenile Life Without Parole Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/miller-valabama-and-juvenile-life-without-parole-laws.aspx.
191
See id.
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there being “appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest
possible penalty. . . .”192 As the Chief Justice noted, this “disclaimer” was
entirely unnecessary to the rule that the majority announced.193
Nevertheless, because of this “decided departure,” many states have
interpreted Miller narrowly and thus, have limited it to only prohibiting
mandatory LWOP sentences. In effect, these states do not interpret Miller
as a prohibition on discretionary or extraordinary length sentences. What
these states fail to acknowledge is that although Miller’s conclusion was
ambiguous, the Supreme Court has nevertheless unambiguously expressed
the “kids are different” principle in various cases over the past decade.
Practically speaking, these states are using the decision in Miller to
inadvertently violate a precedential constitutional principle. Discretionary
sentences usually provide the sentencer with the option of imposing a
variety of sentences,194 and extraordinary length sentences are exactly what
the name suggests; sentences consisting of an unusually extended length of
time.195
Courts struggling with this issue argue that Miller’s language is
explicitly directed solely towards mandatory LWOP sentences, and thus,
does not apply to discretionary or extraordinary length sentences.196 At
least seven of these states that do not consider Miller binding on them
interpret Miller’s holding as only prohibiting mandatory sentences.197 These
states argue that because they provide nonmandatory, or discretionary
sentencing schemes, they are not violating the mandate in Miller because
Miller only prohibits mandatory LWOP sentences on juvenile offenders.198
Thus, a court in these states can still impose a LWOP sentence on a juvenile
offender so long as there is nothing “requiring” it to do so.
As to the states imposing “extraordinary length” sentences, these states
also interpret the holding in Miller narrowly, by finding that Miller only
prohibited mandatory life without parole sentences.199 These states argue
that because they will provide juvenile offenders with parole at a later date,
they are not actually prohibiting parole.200 The caveat lies within the
temporal limitation, which in effect, offers parole at a date so far in the
192

See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
Id. at 2481 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
194
Chang et al., supra note 172, at 95–98.
195
Id. at 99–101.
196
Id. at 95, 98–99.
197
Id. at 98 (including Virginia, Georgia, Nevada, New Mexico, Tennessee, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin).
198
See id. at 95–98.
199
See id. at 99–101.
200
See id. at 100.
193

08-ANDREA HUERTA 04.24.2017.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

208

FIU Law Review

5/11/17 1:32 PM

[Vol. 12:187

future that it will likely exceed the juvenile’s natural life expectancy.201 For
example, in Florida, the longest sentence recorded was a ninety-nine-year
single sentence.202 These sentences are essentially imposing the same
punishment the juvenile would have received had he been sentenced to
LWOP. Thus, the juvenile is facing the “functional equivalent” of LWOP,
without the mandated individualized consideration Miller imposes.203
These sentences deprive the child of the “most basic liberties without
[being] given hope of restoration,” which is constitutionally repugnant
because the Eighth Amendment “forbids States [sic] from making the
judgment at the outset that those offenders [will ever] be fit to reenter
society.”204
Lastly, and perhaps the biggest question moving forward is: what does
Miller require from a sentencer when sentencing a juvenile offender?
While not an exhaustive list, the Court in Miller did offer some sort of
guidance on what sentencing judges should identify when sentencing a
juvenile offender.205 The sentencing judge should consider several factors
relating to specific characteristics surrounding the child and the crime, such
as: (1) the character and record of the individual offender and the
circumstances of the offense; (2) the child’s background, as well as mental
and emotional development, (3) the child’s age and hallmark features; (4)
the child’s family and home environment, especially where it will help the
sentencer understand why the child was surrounded by such a harmful
environment; (5) the child’s participation in the offense, especially with an
eye towards whether peer pressure was involved; (6) whether any lesser
included offenses could have been included; and (7) the child’s ability to be
rehabilitated.206
Nevertheless, although it appears that Miller left the lower courts with
some factors to consider, these factors do not address whether they should
be considered exclusively, whether they are not mutually exclusive, or
instead, whether the lower courts may consider only those factors it deems
appropriate. As to the latter, this increases the risk that a sentencer will

201

See id.
See Maggie Lee, Florida Struggles with Youth Life Sentences, JUV. JUST. INFO. EXCH. (July
30, 2012), http://jjie.org/florida-struggles-youth-life-sentences/90589/ (explaining Florida’s battle with
extraordinary length sentences after Graham).
203
Chang et al., supra note 172, at 100 (as stated above, this Note takes the position that the
individualized consideration mandated by Miller contradicts the principles established in Roper and
Graham, but nevertheless concede to it in this respect, in order to establish that Miller left lower courts
with no direction, which is another problem with the decision in Miller).
204
Id. at 101.
205
See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. at 2468–69 (2012).
206
See id. at 2467–68; see also Chang et al., supra note 172, at 90–91.
202
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subjectively choose which factors to consider while emphasizing the factors
that appeal the most to him or her. This is precisely a risk the Court
expressly warned against in Roper and Graham, when it rejected such
individualized sentencing schemes. Therefore, without further guidance,
the lower courts will essentially be able to continue behaving in a manner
that ignores the constitutional principle that “kids are different.” In fact,
now judges have a list of factors that they can use to justify their decisions
in sentencing juvenile offenders to LWOP.
THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM THROUGH A COMPARATIVE LAW
PERSPECTIVE
The concerns stated above are further exacerbated by evidence of the
juvenile justice system through a comparative law perspective. A close
look at the Court’s precedent shows that it has generally given some
consideration to international standards as part of the Eighth Amendment’s
decency calculus in cases involving juveniles.207 For reasons not explained,
however, the Court in Miller did not partake in any comparative analysis.208
The Court in Miller disregarded the fact that “the international community
speaks with one clear, disapproving voice” towards the way our country
treats juvenile offenders.209 Nevertheless, before delving into why the
comparative law perspective is so important in cases involving juveniles, it
may be helpful to begin by first explaining why a comparative
constitutional law analysis is appropriate and legitimate in the first place.
Constitutional meaning derives from the practice of argument and
appeal made with proper forms, which appeal to the text, history, doctrine,
prudence, structure, and ethos of the Constitution of the United States.210
Thus, judicial review is legitimated by our adherence to these six different
approaches.211 First and foremost, a comparative constitutional analysis has
influenced legal reasoning and judicial decision-making since the birth of
the United States.212 Over the past seventy-five years, the Court has
207

See Craig, supra note 32, at 397–98; see, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
See generally Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
209
See Craig, supra note 32, at 397. For a further explanation on the history of the Supreme
Court’s behavior in interpreting foreign sources of law see for example Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie
Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and
the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 856–57, 859, 864 (Dec. 2005)
[hereinafter Calabresi, The Supreme Court & Foreign Law].
210
Bradley Silverman, The Legitimacy of Comparative Constitutional Law: A Modal
Evaluation, 24 MICH. ST. INT’L. L. REV. 307, 309 (2016).
211
Id. at 309–10.
212
Id. at 310.
208
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referenced foreign law213 in an increasingly significant number of
constitutional cases.214 Therefore, the Court’s precedent implies that it is
appropriate to refer to foreign law in constitutional cases.
Similarly, it is not dispositive that the application of foreign law is not
expressly discussed in the Constitution. Instead, the fact that the
Constitution is silent on applying foreign law suggests that although it does
not condone the practice, it does not condemn it either.215 As former Chief
Justice Marshall once explained, decisions of other countries exhibit how
the law of nations is understood elsewhere, and how it will be considered in
determining the rule, which is to prevail here.216 Those decisions, he
clarified, while not binding authority on United States Courts, merit
respectful attention for their potential persuasive value.217 Consequently,
foreign law serves as a tool that can help the Court understand and interpret
what is, fundamentally, American law.218 For example, just as we regularly
employ a number of various other sources, such as law review articles,
books, other laws, canons of construction, legislative history, and common
law terms of art, we should apply foreign law similarly.219
In determining the meaning of the Eighth Amendment, “the climate of
international opinion concerning the acceptability of a particular
punishment is also not irrelevant.”220 In fact, “[t]o decide any case, a judge
needs to know certain things about the world; statutes and case law cannot
be used to resolve legal disputes, unless on their own, they are applied to
the facts at hand.”221 Accordingly, “foreign decisions may contain truths,
knowledge, or information about facts of the world that are relevant to an
American Judge.”222 As Justice Ginsburg has instructed, judges should
make an effort to learn what they can from the experience and wisdom that

213
See Calabresi, The Supreme Court & Foreign Law, supra note 209, at 748 n.5 (“Foreign law
is considered to include statutes and cases of other countries arrived at after American independence in
1776. We think the term includes the writing of foreign jurists and scholars.”).
214
See id. at 838–39.
215
See Silverman, supra note 210, at 319.
216
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speech at the American University International Academy of
Comparative Law (Jul. 30, 2010) [hereinafter Justice Ginsburg, Speech]; see also Calabresi, The
Supreme Court & Foreign Law, supra note 209, at 763–80 (discussing former Chief Justice John
Marshall’s “lengthy tenure” on the United States Supreme Court, where he wrote several important
opinions that referred to foreign law).
217
Justice Ginsburg, Speech, supra note 216 (discussing Chief Justice Marshall’s perspective on
the impact international law has on U.S. law).
218
See Silverman, supra note 210, at 344.
219
Id. at 310.
220
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033 (2010).
221
See Silverman, supra note 210, at 334.
222
Id.
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foreign sources may convey because they are helpful in what they should
do—and more importantly, they are helpful in what they should not do.223
Notably, relying on foreign law creates healthy relationships around the
world, which builds trust and cooperation between nations to combat
mutual enemies, and find solutions to the new legal problems of today that
practitioners can all learn and benefit from tomorrow.224
Additionally, applying foreign law is further supported in proportion to
how recently it has found expression in the case law.”225 For example, the
Supreme Court of the United States has recently invoked foreign or
international legal sources to aid it in resolving constitutional questions in a
number of recent cases, which represents doctrinal support for citing
This idea focuses on the
foreign law as persuasive authority.226
“consistency, harmonization, and integrity of treating like cases alike.”227
Harmonizing our law with that of other nations allows us to achieve
transnational consistency because “we are bound into a global community,
especially on questions of fundamental rights.”228
However, historical evidence suggests that the application of foreign
law should be limited to cases where the justices must determine whether a
certain practice is reasonable, as it does in the Fourth Amendment context,
or whether it is unusual, as it does in the Eighth Amendment context.229
Specifically, “[w]here the text [of the Constitution] takes the form of
determinate rules, an interpreter’s discretion is fixed; but where it uses
vague standards or abstract principles, we must apply them to our own
circumstances in our own time.”230 For instance, in Roper, the majority
opinion and Justice O’Connor’s dissent both cited foreign law, despite their
disagreement on the constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty.231 In
Roper, the Court compared the number of countries that had executed
juvenile offenders within the preceding fifteen years to demonstrate the
existence of a virtually universal global repulsion toward executing
children.232 In comparing the evolution of the practice in the international
community, the Court explained that referring to the laws of other countries
223

See Justice Ginsburg, Speech, supra note 216.
Id.
225
See Silverman supra note 210, at 327.
226
Id. at 328.
227
Id.
228
Id. at 16.
229
See Calabresi, The Supreme Court & Foreign Sources of Law, supra note 209, at 755–56.
230
Silverman, supra note 210, at 318.
231 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574–79 (2005); see also id. at 605 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
232
See id. at 575–78 (majority opinion).
224
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and international authorities is instructive in interpreting the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments.”233 As a
result, Roper serves as just one example of how the Court has consistently
relied on foreign law; specifically, in cases involving the Eighth
Amendment, which require an analysis into the objective indicia.234
Accordingly, interpreting a textually indeterminate constitutional
provision, such as the Eighth Amendment, in light of contemporary
conditions, requires looking to external sources.235 Therefore, relying on
foreign law is especially appropriate in cases involving cruel and unusual
punishment, where the Court is asked to make determinations of
Moreover, because “comparative analysis is
reasonableness.236
emphatically relevant to the task of . . . enforcing human rights,” applying
foreign law is particularly important in these Eighth Amendment cases.237
Therefore, applying foreign law to cases involving cruel and unusual
punishment reiterates the following two important principles: (1) that our
Constitution is a living document, meant to endure for the ages;238 and (2)
the formulation expressed in Trop v. Dulles.239 Notably, the plurality
opinion in Trop was not only important because it provided the benchmark
for the Court in understanding the phrase “cruel and unusual
punishment,”240 but it is also important because it serves as the beginning
of the modern Court’s reliance on foreign law in its Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. 241 Thus, in Eighth Amendment cases, the Court frequently
looks to foreign law to determine the evolving standards of decency in
evaluating what punishments are unconstitutionally cruel and unusual.242
Therefore, because an international perspective is appropriate and
legitimate in interpreting the Eighth Amendment, this Note will continue by

233

Id.
See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2487 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting how the
Court occasionally relied on foreign law in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005); Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 (1982); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830–31 (1988); and Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977)).
235
See id.
236
See Steven Calabresi, A Shining City on a Hill: American Exceptionalism and the Supreme
Court’s Practice of Relying on Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1335, 1413 (2006).
237
See Thomas E. Baker, A Modest Experiment in Pedagogy: Lessons on Comparative
Constitutional Law, 6 FIU L. REV. 99, 108 (2010–11).
238
See M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
239
See Wormiel, supra note 51 (explaining how the meaning of the Eighth Amendment would
change over time as society’s views on different criminal sanctions changed); see also Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86 (1958).
240
See id.
241
See id.
242
See id.
234
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explaining its importance in relation to Miller v. Alabama and specifically,
as it relates to the issues surrounding the juvenile justice system. As
mentioned above, over the last seventy-five years, a significant number of
cases have relied on foreign law in criminal cases.243 In fact, most Eighth
Amendment cases decided during the last seventy-five years have, at the
minimum, at least impliedly or expressly mentioned foreign law.244
However, the Court in Miller did not; instead, it ignored the fact that the
United States is currently the only country in the world that is responsible
for 100% of all the children currently being sentenced to die in prison as a
result of their LWOP sentences.245
Moreover, the international community has impliedly confirmed the
Court’s own principle that “kids are different,” where most states246 have
either never allowed, expressly prohibited, or avoided sentencing juvenile
offenders to LWOP.247 In fact, international law recognizes that sentencing
children to LWOP contravenes society’s notion of fairness and emphasizes
the “shared legal responsibility” that society has in protecting and
promoting child development.248 Hence, there is a clear international
consensus against sentencing juvenile offenders to LWOP.249
In addition to this international consensus, there are human rights
treaties that prohibit LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders in which the
United States is a party.250 Treaties are relevant to the Eighth Amendment
analysis because the United States is a party to several of these treaties.251
As a party to a treaty, the United States assumes the responsibility of
complying with such international obligations.252 Moreover, under the
United States Constitution, the United States must uphold these legal

243
See Calabresi, The Supreme Court & Foreign Sources of Law, supra note 209, at 846 (noting
there is “scarcely a prominent Eighth Amendment case decided during the last sixty-five years that does
not at least mention foreign legal opinion and practice”).
244
See id.
245
Connie De La Vega & Michelle Leighton, Article: Sentencing Our Children to Die in Prison:
Global Law and Practice, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 983, 989 (2008).
246
This Note follows the international practice of referring to the nations around the world as
“states,” which is commonly done in the international realm.
247
De La Vega & Leighton, supra note 245, at 989 (explaining that as of 2008, there were at
least 135 states that expressly rejected the sentence via their domestic legal commitments, and 185
countries that have done so in the U.N. General Assembly).
248
Id. at 1008–09.
249
See Brief of Amici Curiae Amnesty International, et al., in Support of Petitions at *6, Miller
v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647).
250
See id. at *6.
251
See id. at *28.
252
See id.
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obligations.253 Specifically, there are two relevant treaties that relate to
juvenile sentencing practice. First, is the Committee on Rights of the Child
(“CRC”), which forbids sentencing juveniles to LWOP. Second, is the
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), which
reflects language similar to the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.254
The CRC requires states to prohibit sentencing juvenile offenders to
the death penalty and LWOP.255 The United States is the only country in
the world that has failed to ratify the CRC.256 Additionally, the ICCPR
prohibits “cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment.”257 It
also requires prisons to focus on reforming and socially rehabilitating
prisoners, as well as segregating juvenile offenders from adult offenders so
that treatment can be provided according to the offender’s age and legal
status.258
However, the United State has failed to comply with the ICCPR since
its ratification. In fact, fourteen years after the U.S. ratified the ICCPR, the
Committee on Human Rights determined the U.S. had failed to comply with
the treaty, despite its reservation, where the U.S. reserved its right to try
juvenile offenders in adult court only in “exceptional circumstances.”259
The ICCPR determined that the U.S. was abusing its reservation in applying
LWOP sentences only in “exceptional circumstances.”260 The ICCPR
concluded that the U.S. was not limiting LWOP sentences to “exceptional
circumstances.”261 Instead, the ICCPR found that a significant number of
U.S. children—many of whom were first-time offenders—had been tried as
adults.262
This is just one example of how the United States continues to
disregard international norms and rules, some of which it has formally
agreed to follow, and subsequently violated. It is clear that the U.S. is not
in compliance with its international obligations. Specifically, the fact that
the U.S. is the only country in the world that still permits sentencing
253

See id.
De La Vega & Leighton, supra note 245, at 1009.
255
Id.
256
See id.
257
ICCPR art. 7.
258
ICCPR art. 10(3).
259
De La Vega & Leighton, supra note 245, at 1010–11 n.145. In its ratification of the ICCPR,
the United States declared, “The United States reserves the right, in exceptional circumstances, to treat
juveniles as adults, notwithstanding paragraphs 2(b) and 3 of article 10 and paragraph 4 of article 14.”
260
Id. at 1010–11.
261
See id.
262
Id.
254
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children to LWOP, indicates an international consensus against this
practice. Consequently, the U.S. must make significant changes to ensure
that juvenile offenders are proportionately sentenced so that it is in
compliance with its international obligations, and in turn, effectively begin
to display the “kids are different” principle that the Supreme Court has
emphatically advocated for within the past decade.
ALTERNATIVES: A CUMULATIVE EFFORT
Despite all that has been said as to “where Miller went wrong,” it is
nevertheless a decision handed down by the United States Supreme Court.
Moreover, it was premised on the “kids are different” principle. In
addition, it is currently the only guiding decision on LWOP sentences for
juvenile homicide offenders. It is also helpful as a starting point for a
cumulative effort for juvenile justice reform. This cumulative effort
requires the cooperation of all those involved with juvenile offenders. For
example, state actors should do their best to give “meaningful effect to the
substantive principles animated in the Court’s prior decisions.”263 After
Miller, state governments should have attempted to take “proactive”
measures.264 Ideally, state legislatures should have filled the gaps where
outdated legislation prevented judges from acting.265 Moreover, state courts
should have re-analyzed previously sentenced juvenile offenders, as well as
juvenile sentencing in its entirety.266 Notwithstanding the ambiguities that
resonated from the decision in Miller, one thing is clear: because “children
are categorically different in the eyes of the law at sentencing . . .
prosecutorial practices should reflect that interpretation of the
Constitution.”267 However, it appears that this principle has “fallen on deaf
ears.”268
If our juvenile justice system is to experience any real, positive
change, there must be a cumulative effort on behalf of all three branches of
government. To begin, our state lawmakers must accept their responsibility
in taking the first step.269 For instance, mandatory LWOP is a statutorybased penalty.270 Accordingly, in Miller, the Court considered the objective

263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270

See, e.g., Drinan, supra note 184, at 788.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 785.
See id. at 786.
See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2471 n.10 (2012).
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indicia of society’s standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and
state practice to determine whether there was a national consensus against
LWOP.271 As a result, the legislature’s actions and states’ practices were a
direct result of why the Court decided the way it did. However, as
previously mentioned, although prohibiting or removing mandatory LWOP
sentences is a step in the right direction, when these sentences are replaced
with discretionary or extraordinary length sentences, the state is in-effect
contravening “the spirit of Miller.”272 Therefore, in order to “embrace the
Supreme Court’s vision” of treating juvenile offenders differently because
of their capacity for change, state lawmakers must consider alternatives to
help juvenile inmates in the long run.273
States should begin by re-focusing the juvenile justice system to reflect
its originally intended purpose: to be an alternative system to the adult
criminal system, which focuses on individualized rehabilitation and
treatment, civil jurisdiction, informal procedure, and separate
incapacitation.274 A good example of this is exhibited in the innovative
policies and programs recently implemented by the state legislatures in
Maine, Maryland, and New Jersey.275 Specifically, in 2015, the Maine
Supreme Court modified the Rules of Unified Criminal Procedure to
prohibit using restraints on juveniles in the courtrooms.276 Additionally,
Maryland and New Jersey passed stricter laws to lessen the number of
juveniles being charged as adults.277 State lawmakers should also ensure
that prisons provide these juvenile inmates with opportunities to
demonstrate their capacity for change.278 This can be accomplished by
providing juvenile inmates with classes relating to “substance abuse and
alcohol education and treatment, as well as employment and skills
training.”279
Additionally, state court judges, who play a more active role in
sentencing, can make a significant difference in the juvenile justice system
271

See id. at 2480.
See Drinan, supra note 184, at 793.
273
See id.
274
Tanehaus, supra note 18 (explaining the principles that the first juvenile justice system in the
U.S. was founded upon).
275
See NCSL Juvenile Justice Quarterly Newsletter, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan.
2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/ncsl-juvenile-justice-quarterly-newsletter
635876058.aspx.
276
See id.
277
See id.; cf. H.R. 618, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2015) (ending the practice of
automatically holding juveniles, who are being charged as adults, in adult criminal court), and S.J. Res.
2003, 216th Leg., (N.J. 2003) (increasing the minimum age that a youth can be tried as an adult).
278
See Drinan, supra note 184, at 793.
279
See id.
272
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as well.280 As noted in the cases discussed thus far, sentencing judges often
have one of the closest interactions with the inmate and the case. This
makes them more capable of ensuring first-hand that juvenile offenders
receive a fair process.281 These judges have the power of deciding whether
to implement the individualized sentencing approach mandated by Miller
by interpreting their state constitutional provisions in a way that either
expands or minimizes Miller’s reach.282 Therefore, state court judges are
equipped with the “tools” necessary to give substantive meaning to the
Court’s vision of juvenile rehabilitation, and the ability to ensure that such
decisions are applied even-handedly.283
Executive actors also share the responsibility of upholding “the law of
the land” because of the important role they play within the administration
of the juvenile justice system.284 Considering Miller’s mandate on
individualized sentencing, executive state actors are uniquely situated
because of “the executive branch’s agility and discretion.”285 Accordingly,
before a juvenile’s case ever reaches a judge, state prosecutors first have the
responsibility of charging and then subsequently sentencing the juvenile
offender.286 A prosecutor basically “lives” with the case starting at its
inception and therefore, has the power to not only control the direction the
case travels, but also, to ensure that the juvenile is given a fair and just
process.
Specifically, prosecutors often have the discretion of deciding whether
a juvenile offender will be transferred to the adult criminal system.287 This
raises an immediate concern for a juvenile offender because most
jurisdictions employ generally applicable penalty provisions, which means
that in a jurisdiction mandating juvenile LWOP, the juvenile can be
sentenced to LWOP without his or her age ever being considered.288
Additionally, some states have no minimum age standards or rules
restricting the age that a juvenile may be transferred to adult court.289 In

280

Id.
See id.; see, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
282
See Drinan, supra note 184, at 793 (noting that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
found the Miller decision applied retroactively and that discretionary LWOP sentences for juvenile
homicide offenders were unconstitutional under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights).
283
See id.
284
See id.
285
See id. at 794.
286
See id.
287
See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2473 (2012) (“Almost all jurisdictions allow some
juveniles to be tried in adult court for some kinds of homicide.”).
288
See id.
289
See id.
281
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some states, children as young as thirteen are transferred to the adult
criminal system, where they not only sit in jail alongside adult criminal
offenders, but are also tried and sentenced before judges who deal with
adult criminal offenders on a daily basis. As a result, these children are
prevented from receiving the very benefits or rights upon which the juvenile
justice system was created.
Moreover, when deciding whether to transfer a juvenile to the adult
criminal system, prosecutors are sometimes not required to take the child’s
age or maturity into account; in some jurisdictions, prosecutors are even
able to unilaterally decide whether to file the case directly in adult court
without providing the juvenile with a hearing.290 This legal practice is
known as “direct file,” and it allows prosecutors to exclusively make the
decision of where to file the case, allowing the prosecutor to act as both
judge and jury.291 Although the issues of transferring juvenile offenders to
the adult criminal court system will be discussed below, the fact that
prosecutors have the sole discretion of immediately and expeditiously
controlling this process from the get-go, evidences the enormous amount of
power they have, where they not only control—and thus, limit—the number
of transfers, but also, are in an especially valuable position to protect the
life of the juvenile offender.
Florida’s “direct file” system highlights the need for change in the
juvenile justice system.292 This Note uses Florida to illustrate the many
issues surrounding the “direct file” system that is employed by many other
states nationwide.293 Specifically, and perhaps most shockingly, according
to a study conducted by The James Madison Institute, since 2009, more
than 12,000 children were tried as adults in Florida.294 This study analyzed
the effects of keeping children within the juvenile justice system and
concluded that sending children to adult court actually increases crime and

290

Tchoukleva, supra note 21.
See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2474 n.16 (listing Florida, Michigan, and Virginia); see, e.g., Sal
Nuzzo et al., Policy Brief, No Place for A Child: Direct File for Juveniles Comes at A High Cost; Time
to Fix Statutes, JAMES MADISON INST. at 1 (Feb. 2016), http://www.jamesmadison.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016-Juvenile-Justice-Policy-Brief-21.pdf [hereinafter Policy Brief, JAMES MADISON
INSTITUTE]; see also Direct File Wrong for Juvenile Offenders, MIAMI HERALD (Oct. 26, 2015),
http://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/editorials/article41433630.html.
292
See generally Policy Brief, JAMES MADISON INSTITUTE, supra note 291; see also Miller, 132
S. Ct. at 2473–75 (discussing the jurisdictions that transfer juveniles to adult court).
293
This Note uses Florida as an example because Florida currently has the highest number of
adult transfers of any state, and thus, is the state that requires the most critical examination); see e.g.,
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2474 n.16 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.557(1) (West 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 712A.2(a)(1) (West 2015); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1–241(A), 16.1–269.1(C), (D) (West 2012)).
294
See Policy Brief, JAMES MADISON INSTITUTE, supra note 291, at 1; see Miller, 132 S. Ct. at
2473–75 (discussing the jurisdictions that transfer juveniles to adult court).
291
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reduces public safety.295 Youth who are transferred to the adult criminal
justice system are more likely to recidivate than those retained in the
juvenile justice system.296 The evidence overwhelmingly displays that
keeping children in the juvenile justice system results in children being
treated through a variety of programs such as, diversion, probation,
redirection, and non-secure detention.297 Ultimately, the study implicitly
confirmed the Supreme Court’s principle behind treating children
differently. It determined that the juvenile justice system is more effective
in promoting rehabilitation than the adult criminal justice system.298 For
example, a juvenile offender who is transferred to the adult criminal system
is approximately 34% percent more likely to be rearrested for a felony than
a juvenile offender who had stayed in the juvenile justice system.299
Even more compelling, the study found that economically, a
reinvestment strategy directed at keeping children within the juvenile
justice system, while offering them rehabilitative and educational programs,
would result in savings of about $12 million.300 Although the reinvestment
program would not immediately produce significant fiscal savings, these
alternative rehabilitative and educational programs would ultimately result
in long-term savings.301 In emphasizing the competing interests between
juvenile offenders and the public safety, this realignment strategy would
focus on creating a system designed to address a juvenile offender’s
developmental challenges and opportunities.302 Accordingly, juvenile
offenders would be examined under a variety of Department of Juvenile
Justice assessment tools, such as the Positive Achievement Change Tool
Assessment and the Disposition Matrix.303 The results from these
assessments would help determine the level of supervision and the types of
rehabilitative programs that the child will need.304 Therefore, the program
would cater to those children who need more intensive supervision and
rehabilitative services than others.305 As a result, these children will be
supervised much closer than they would have been in the adult criminal
justice system, resulting in less recidivism, and in effect, more productive
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305

See Policy Brief, THE JAMES MADISON INSTITUTE, supra note 291, at 2–3.
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members of society.306
Florida’s realignment strategy is consistent with the principles that the
Court illustrated in Miller. Although the individualized consideration
expressed in Miller runs contrary to the precedent in which it relied, and
serves as a double-edged sword against juveniles, the use of individualized
considerations in Florida’s realignment procedure seems appropriate and
effective. This strategy embraces everything the Court has expressed over
the past decade in relation to how “kids are different.” It does not limit
itself to only addressing issues of sentencing or rehabilitation. Instead, it
focuses on the entire situation: from the moment the juvenile offender
enters the juvenile justice system, throughout the legal proceedings, and
then at the end, when the juvenile is either sentenced, placed in in
probation, or is order to receive services. Additionally, this strategy focuses
on providing juveniles with the hope that someone else is “rooting for
them,” while also providing a realistic and viable opportunity for change
and growth.307 Here, “good behavior and character improvement” are not
immaterial; instead, they are completely relevant.308 Therefore, this
program effectively balances society’s concerns with that of a juvenile
offender’s, which, as mentioned above, was the focus of our nation’s first
juvenile courts.
Moreover, in Miller, the Court compared the discretion that judges
have in transfer hearings with the discretion judges have at sentencing.309
In doing so, the Court briefly addressed the issue of transferring juvenile
offenders to the adult criminal system and acknowledged the “key moment
for the exercise of discretion is the transfer.”310 It noted that judges often
determine whether to transfer a juvenile based on limited information
because judges usually do not know what they will learn about the offender
or the case over the course of the proceeding.311 Interestingly enough,
however, the Court noted that when granting a transfer, some judges will do
so based on the fact that the judge believes the juvenile deserves a “much
harsher sentence than he would receive in juvenile court.”312 The Court

306

Id. (noting how more than seventy-two percent of juveniles transferred to the adult justice
system are placed on adult probation, does nothing to protect society because in the adult system,
probation has very little rehabilitative elements, and offenders are usually not supervised strictly).
307
See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 70 (2010) (LWOP “means a denial of hope; that good
behavior and character improvement are immaterial; it means that whatever the future might hold in
store for the mind and spirit of the convict, he will remain in prison for the rest of his days.”).
308
Id.
309
See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2474 (2012).
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See id.
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See id. (This refers only to those jurisdictions that allow for transfer hearings).
312
Id. at 2475.
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observed that judges often use their subjective judgment in their rulings.313
In fact, the Court made this distinction in defending against permitting
judges from making individualized considerations about the child at the
transfer hearing.314
So, why is an individualized consideration appropriate at a sentencing
hearing, yet inappropriate at a transfer hearing when the same
rationalizations exist in both situations? In its analysis, the Court in Miller
appears to be undermining this idea, where it explained the risk associated
with a child being transferred to the adult system unfairly and
disproportionately.315 Despite the Court’s attempt to distinguish the two
situations, it nevertheless concluded that the “discretion available to a judge
at the transfer stage cannot substitute for discretion at post-trial sentencing
in adult-court.”316 The Court somehow rationalized that permitting a
judge’s discretion would be better served at a sentencing hearing, which is
the last and final stage of the trial process available to an offender.317
However, this can hardly be seen as a “better substitution,” when it is “the
last and final stage,” and where the only correction that can be made is at
the appellate level.
This is one of the most prevalent issues facing juvenile offenders all
over the country today. It is an issue that must be addressed and abolished
in totality. As the Court in Miller conceded, judges will inject their own
subjective reasoning into their decisions despite the lack of information
available to them.318 There is no evidence that a judge who uses his or her
subjective reasoning in a transfer hearing, where there is limited
information, will not do so again at a sentencing hearing. Therefore,
individualized considerations serve no purpose in the realm of sentencing
juvenile offenders.
Finally, Governors can also play a role in bringing state practice into
compliance with the Supreme Court’s view on treating juveniles differently
by using their “obligation to exercise mercy where it is appropriate,” which
is also known as the clemency power.319 Governors could potentially
appoint “Miller Commissions,” whose charge would be: (1) [T]o identify
all state inmates affected by the . . . Miller decision; (2) identify a range of
appropriate sentences for such inmates; and (3) to make recommendations

313
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to the governor regarding each inmate and what new sentence may be
appropriate in light of the Miller sentencing factors. 320 In effect, this would
allow the executive branch to remedy several problems all at once.321
Governors would be able to reach cases the courts cannot, ensure that
federal law is applied even-handedly, and to avoid the “piecemeal nature of
failed legislative attempts and wildly unpredictable court outcomes,” all
while providing juvenile inmates relief in an expeditious manner.322
Accordingly, states have the power to effectively balance the public
safety concerns with the need to treat these offenders fairly and
proportionately.323 In reality, abolishing LWOP only means that states will
be providing these offenders, who were sentenced to LWOP as children,
with a possibility—not a guarantee—of being released within their
lifetime.324 Despite the concerns surrounding the juvenile justice system,
the states are in a unique position to take the lead and revise their
sentencing practices to exhibit a growing consensus among the states and
eventually align the U.S. with international norms.325 However, in order to
ensure that a meaningful effect is given to the Supreme Court’s vision of
juvenile rehabilitation and the “kids are different” principle, states must
consider a “complete overhaul of juvenile incarceration” altogether.326
Given all that we know about how “kids are different,” states can no longer
turn a blind eye; states are now equally responsible for ensuring that
juvenile offenders are given the opportunity to mature and reform, as well
as demonstrate these changes.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Miller signaled another one of the
Court’s minimalistic approaches towards redefining our nation’s juvenile
justice system within the last decade. Despite the Supreme Court’s most
recent ruling in Montgomery v. Louisiana, the decision in Miller,
nevertheless failed to account for other aspects affecting the juvenile justice
system and those juvenile offenders who can still potentially face LWOP
sentences. This decision not only runs afoul to its prior decisions in Roper
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and Graham, but also to the penological goals for punishment and from a
comparative law perspective. The decision in Miller detoured around the
principle that “kids are different,” and that children have a “diminished
capacity that makes them less culpable” than adults. Consequently, states
were left to interpret Miller’s mandate differently, which in turn, resulted in
similarly situated children being sentenced very differently. Our juvenile
justice system has experienced a bumpy ride in the United States.
However, this is not dispositive of the Court’s ability to clarify its
decision in Miller and foreclose on the issues surrounding the juvenile
justice system once and for all. The most important issue relating to
prohibiting juvenile offenders from being sentenced to LWOP begins with
the issue of transferring juveniles to adult court. Transferring juvenile
offenders to the adult criminal system serves little-to-no purpose and
considering the alternatives available, there should never be such an
“extraordinary circumstance” justifying a juvenile offender’s transfer to the
adult criminal system; especially before other alternatives have been
explored. Additionally, it is extremely compelling that the United States is
one of the only countries in the world that does not prohibit, and still
sentences, juvenile offenders to LWOP. By emphasizing the importance of
parole boards and abolishing the transfer of juveniles to adult court, the
Court could’ve satisfied the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual
punishment, and more importantly, followed the principle it has repeatedly
emphasized in its decisions over the past decade: that children should be
and will be treated differently and proportionately within the juvenile
justice system of the United States.

